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I. INTRODUCTION
The Telecommunications Act of 19961 ("1996 Act') instructed the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission") to ensure
that all Americans have access to affordable telecommunications services.2
Consistent with that mandate, the Commission now seeks to secure
affordable telecommunications services for those in rural, insular, and high-3
cost areas. More importantly, the FCC held a series of public hearings to
discuss with Tribes4 the issues they face concerning low telephone
penetration rates.5 The FCC recommended investigation of universal
1. Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2. Id § 151.
3. Id § 254(b)(3).
4. The FCC uses the terms "Indians" and "Indian tribes" according to the Federally
Recognized Indian Tribe List. See The Federally Recognized Indian Tribe List Act of 1994,
§§101-04, 25 U.S.C. § 479a (1994) [hereinafter Indian Tribe Act]. The term "Indian"
describes:
all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe now
under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such members
who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian
reservation, and shall further include all other persons of one-half or more Indian
blood .... Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples of Alaska shall be considered
Indians.
Id. § 479. The term "Indian tribe" means "any Indian or Alaska Native tribe, band, nation,
pueblo, village or community that the Secretary of the Interior acknowledged to exist as an
Indian tribe." Id. § 479a(2). An annual list of all Indian tribes that the Secretary of the
Interior recognizes as eligible for special services and programs provided by the United
States appears in the Federal Register. Id § 479a-l(a).
5. See FCC Will Hold a Series of Pub. Hearings on Telephone Serv. for Indians on
Reservations and Seeks Comments from the General Public on all Testimony and Other
Evidence Presented Therein, Public Notice, 14 F.C.C.R. 3331 (1999); FCC to Hold Second
Public Hearing in Series on Telephone Serv. for Indians on Reservations, Public Notice, 14
F.C.C.R. 3522 (1999).
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service in unserved and underserved areas because telephone penetration
rates among low-income consumers on tribal lands lagged behind rates in
the rest of the country.6 Approximately 94.2% of all U.S. households have
telephone service,7 while subscribership on tribal lands is 46.6%.8
After meeting with Indian leaders and telecommunications service
providers at two formal field hearings held in New Mexico and Arizona,
the FCC tentatively implemented several policies to address low telephone
penetration rates on tribal lands.9 In response to the many requests made by
tribal leaders for a statement of policy that recognizes tribal sovereignty
and the government's fiduciary duty to Tribes, the FCC validated its
commitment to promoting a government-to-government relationship
between the FCC and all federally recognized Tribes. Specifically, the FCC
reaffirmed its commitment to: (1) "work with Indian Tribes on a
government-to-government basis consistent with the principles of Tribal
self-governance;" (2) "consult with Tribal governments prior to
implementing any regulatory action or policy that will significantly or
uniquely affect Tribal governments, their land and resources;" and (3)
"identify innovative mechanisms to facilitate Tribal consultation in agency
regulatory processes that uniquely affect telecommunications compliance
activities.., and other telecommunications service-related issues on Tribal
lands."'0 Despite the FCC's positive policy statements, however, it also
established that such statements do not "create any right enforceable in any
cause of action" against the FCC, the United States, or any other party."
Furthermore, in its effort to understand the reasons for low
penetration rates on tribal lands, the FCC requested comments concerning
its proposed rules on tribal jurisdiction. 12 Specifically, the FCC sought
comments regarding the extent of state and tribal regulation of tribally
owned or nontribally owned telecommunications carriers providing service
6. National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA), Falling
Through the Net: Defining the Digital Divide, (July, 8 1999) at http:llwww.ntia.doc.gov/
ntiahome/press/fttn070899.htm.
7. In the Matter of Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv.: Promoting Deployment and
Subscribership in Unserved and Underserved Areas, Including Tribal and Insular Areas,
FurtherNotice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 21,177 (1999) [hereinafter Unserved
and Underserved, Further Notice].
8. Id.
9. In the Matter of Statement of Policy Establishing a Government-to-Government
Relationship with Tribes, Policy Statement, FCC 00-207 (June 23, 2000), 2000 WL 800896
(FCC).
10. Id.
11. Id
12. See Unserved and Underserved, FurtherNotice, supra note 7.
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to tribal lands.'3 This includes jurisdiction questions with respect to: (1)
tribally owned or operated carriers providing service within reservations to
tribal members, nontribal members, and nontribal members living on
nonnative fee lands (within the reservation);14 (2) nontribally owned or
operated carriers offering service both inside and outside of the reservation;
and (3) tribally owned or operated carriers offering service outside the
reservation.'s The parameters of federal, state, and tribal authority are not
always clear. As the United States Supreme Court acknowledged in dicta,
"[g]eneralizations on this subject [of Federal Indian policy] have become
particularly treacherous."'
6
Despite the complexities of determining tribal and state jurisdiction,
the FCC tentatively established a framework to answer the jurisdictional
questions posed in previous proceedings.17 First, under 47 U.S.C. §
214(e)(6),' the Commission may designate tribally owned and nontribally
owned carriers serving tribal lands as eligible carriers. 9 The threshold
question in these situations is whether the state lacks jurisdiction to
designate and regulate carriers wishing to serve tribal lands.0 The FCC
must consider "whether state regulation is preempted by federal regulation,
whether state regulation is consistent with tribal sovereignty and self-
determination, and whether the Tribe has consented to state jurisdiction."''
Second, when tribally owned and nontribally owned carriers seek to serve
nontribal lands, even if those lands are included within the reservation's
boundaries, the state commission must determine whether it has
13. Id. para. 41.
14. See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OFFEDERAL INDIAN LAW (Rennard Strickland et al. eds.,
1982) (discussing the General Allotment (Dawes) Act of 1887, under which each head of
the household was allotted 160 acres and minors were allotted forty acres.) Congress
amended the Dawes Act in 1891 to provide to each Indian allotments of either eighty acres
of agricultural land or 160 acres of grazing land. After twenty-five years passed, the land
would become free land, meaning individual Indians would have all rights of ownership and
alienability, unlike Irust land in which Indians have only a possessory interest in the land.
See also Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
15. See Unserved and Underserved, Further Notice, supra note 7, para. 41.
16. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
17. See In the Matters of Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv.; Promoting
Deployment and Subscribership in Unserved and Underserved Areas, Including Tribal and
Insular Areas, Twelfth Report and Order, Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, CC Docket No. 96-45, FCC 00-208 (June 30, 2000), 2000
WL 870831 (F.C.C.) [hereinafter Promoting Universal Serv., Report and Order].
18. 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(6) (Supp. IV 1998).
19. See Promoting Universal Serv., Report and Order, supra note 17.
20. See id
21. Id. para. 108.
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jurisdiction considering the same factors listed above 22
This Note argues that the FCC's proposed tribal and state jurisdiction
policies deter eligible telecommunications companies ("telcos") from
serving tribal and nontribal land, because the process of petitioning the
state or federal commission to determine jurisdiction takes time and goes
against the principles of tribal sovereignty. Prevailing FCC proposals
impede Tribes' abilities to attract carriers because current provisions do not
clearly define which sovereign-the Tribe or the state-maintains taxation
and regulatory authority over eligible telecommunications carriers. Lastly,
although the FCC initiated a sweeping policy affirming government-to-
government relations with Tribes, this policy does not extend far enough to
assure Tribes that states will not infringe on their ability to create
economically viable infrastructures on tribal lands.
Part II of this Note provides an overarching history of the Federal
Universal Service Plan ("Federal Plan"), and the considerable
responsibilities given to states to further the goals of universal service.
Parts III and IV examine the complex development of tribal and state
jurisdictional analysis. Part V applies the elaborate jurisdictional analysis
uncovered in Parts III and IV, using South Dakota regulations and case law
to illustrate how state regulations affect telecommunications carriers
serving tribal lands. Part VI proposes that Congress must expressly limit
state jurisdiction in order for telephone penetration rates to increase on
tribal lands. Without state taxation and regulation, Tribes may opt to
impose their regulations on eligible carriers. Furthermore, eligible carriers
would not suffer from dual taxation and regulation from Tribes and states
under the current Supreme Court's jurisdictional framework if the FCC
lobbied Congress for express federal preemption of state jurisdiction over
carriers serving tribal lands and tribal members. Tribes should also have the
opportunity to contract with states to waive jurisdiction if the states have
historically assumed jurisdiction over carriers serving tribal lands. This
Note concludes that Tribes are sovereigns and that the FCC must do more
than negotiate with them on a government-to-government basis. Because
recent Supreme Court precedent seems to divest Tribes of their territorial
and regulatory authority, Congress must explicitly permit Tribes' exclusive
tax and regulatory authority oier eligible carriers serving their lands and
people.
22. I. pa a. 122.
.141
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11. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE
In response to Congress's mandate to implement a new universal
service plan, the FCC adopted the Federal Plan in the Report and Order,
entitled Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service ("Universal
Service Order"), to execute the universal service provisions of the 1996
Act?. 3 The Federal Plan aimed to extend telecommunications services "to as
many members of society as possible," while providing the necessary
funding to support the policy.24 The Federal Plan evidenced Congress's
intent for all consumers to receive telecommunications services at
nondiscriminatory prices regardless of the additional costs involved in
providing service to rural areas.25 Specifically, the Federal Plan establishes
several universal service principles:
(1) quality services should be available at just, reasonable, and
affordable rates; (2) access to advanced telecommunications and
information services should be provided in all regions of the Nation;
(3) consumers in all regions of the Nation ... should have access to
telecommunications and information services, ... that are reasonably
comparable to those services provided in urban areas ... ; (4) all
providers of telecommunications services should make an equitable
and non-discriminatory contribution to ... universal service; (5) there
should be specific, predictable and sufficient Federal and State
mechanisms to preserve and advance universal service.
26
In addition, the Federal Plan funds "single-party service; voice grade access
to the public switched network; DTMF signaling or its functional
equivalent; access to emergency services; access to operator services;
access to interexchange service; access to directory assistance; and toll
limitation services for qualifying low-income consumers.
' 27
Only eligible telecommunications carriers may receive support from
the Federal Plan, which uses federal subsidies to offset costs of telephone
service to low-income individuals. 2" The Federal Plan defines an eligible
telecommunications carrier as simply a common carrier that must provide
universal support services by "using its own facilities or a combination of
its own facilities," and that is required to "advertise the availability of such
23. Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 8776, 7
Comm. Reg. (P & F) 109 (1997) [hereinafter Universal Serv., Order).
24. Eli M. Noam, Will Universal Service and Common Carriage Survive the
Telecommunications Act of 1996?, 97 COLUi. L. Rnv. 955, 957 (1997).
25. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-52,251,332 (Supp. IV 1998).
26. Universal Serv., Order, supra note 23, para. 21.
27. Ikl para. 61.
28. See Rea Howarth, Getting Connected: Bridging the Telecommunications Divide
AM. INDiAN REP., March 2000, at 12, 13.
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services and the charges... using media of general distribution."' 9
Since the 1996 Act seeks to increase competition in the
telecommunications industry at the local service level and provide
reasonable and affordable rates, Congress delegated to states the authority
to designate and regulate telecommunications carriers eligible for universal
service under the Federal Plan.30 hn essence, "state commissions [would be]
on the front lines and [would] have a tremendous responsibility to act as the
administrators of federal and state universal service programs." 31
A. State Obligations in Implementing Universal Service
Traditionally, states must ensure that universal service is available at
just, reasonable, and affordable rates. Under the 1996 Act, states are given
significant responsibility to maintain universal service in a competitive
environment. 2 Specifically, section 254(f) of the 1996 Act provides:
A State may adopt regulations not inconsistent with the
Commission's rules to preserve and advance universal service. Every
telecommunications carrier that provides intrastate telecommunications
services shall contribute, on an equitable and nondiscriminatory basis,
in a manner determined by the State to the preservation and
advancement of universal service in that State. A State may adopt
regulations to provide for additional definitions and standards to
preserve and advance universal service within that State only to the
extent that such regulations adopt additional specific, predictable, and
sufficient mechanisms to support such definitions or standards that do
not rely on or burden Federal universal service support mechanisms.33
State commissions have authority to determine which carriers are eligible
to receive universal service support and which are subject to universal
service obligations and to determine when a carrier may be relieved of its
universal service obligations. 4 States may also adopt separate .state
universal service programs, provided that their rules are "not inconsistent
with" the FCC's universal service regulations and are supported by
"specific, predictable, and sufficient mechanisms." 35 Thus, section 254(t)
creates a delicate balance between encouraging states to adopt intrastate
universal service programs and ensuring that state programs do not
interfere with the federal universal service support mechanisms.
29. 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(1)(A).
30. Phillip Rosario & Mark F. Kohler, The Telecommunications Act of 1996. A State
Perspective, 29 CONN. L. REV. 331, 339-41 (1996).
31. I& at341.
32. Id. at 339.
33. 47 U.S.C. § 254(t).
34. See id § 214(e)(2)-(4).
35. Id. § 254(f).
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B. Extent of Federal Support for Universal Service
As stated above, section 254 requires that universal service support
mechanisms may be "specific, predictable, and sufficient." 6 Congress
never presupposed what "reasonable" or "affordability" would entail in
terms of a particular number of dollars, nor did Congress establish a
particular formula identifying how states and the federal government would
share in funding universal service programs.37 The 1996 Act, however,
conferred upon the FCC a responsibility to ensure that the federal universal
service mechanism adheres to all of the principles specified in the statute,
including the requirement that the mechanism be specific and predictable. 8
The FCC established two high-cost support mechanisms to promote
availability of telephone service at reasonable rates. The first approach
applies to rural incumbent local exchange carriers ("ILECs"). 39 Generally,
rural ILECs face higher-than-average local loop costs of telephone
service.40 To enable state jurisdictions to establish lower local exchange
rates to rural study areas,4 the FCC developed the high-cost loop fund.2
The high-cost loop fund provides rural ILECs with the ability to allocate
the higher loop costs to interstate jurisdictions to be recovered from
interstate revenues. 43 Under this scheme, the federal mechanism provides
support for the carrier's loop costs exceeding 115% of the national average
cost per loop.44
For nonrural carriers, the FCC "concluded that the federal share of the
difference between a carrier's forward looking economic cost of providing
supported services and the national benchmark will be 25 percent."45
36. Id.
37. Noam, supra note 24, at 961-62.
38. Rosario & Kohler, supra note 30, at 340.
39. An ILEC is defined in the Act as a LEC that, with respect to an area: (1) provided
telephone exchange service in such area on February 8, 1996, the date of enactment of the
1996 Act; and (2) was a member of NECA on February 8, 1996, or became such member's
successor or assign. 47 U.S.C. § 251(h).
40. Universal Serv. Task Force, Common Carrier Bureau, Federal Communications
Commission, Preparation for Addressing Universal Service Issues: A Review of Current
Interstate Support Mechanisms 50-65 (Feb. 23, 1996), available at http:/lvwwv.fcc.gov/
Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/univserv.txt (rural LECs have higher loop costs because
of subscriber density, terrain, and size of local exchanges in rural areas).
41. See 47 C.F.R. § 36 (1999) (defining study area as an area for purposes of
determining universal obligations and support).
42. Id. § 36.611.
43. Id.
44. See id. § 36.63(c), (d).
45. Universal Serv., Order, supra note 23, para. 269. Forward-looking costs are
determined by costs of providing service per line and then subtracting a national benchmark
representing average revenues per line. The costs that the nonrural carrier cannot recover
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Therefore, the states are responsible for supporting the remaining 75% of
high-cost support for carniers within their boundaries.46 Nonrural carriers
transitioned from the high-cost loop fund approach to the forward-looking
cost model on January 1, 19997
The debate continues concerning the 25/75 split.48 "If only 25 percent
of the universal service support mechanism is to be funded through the
federal jurisdiction, the states will be on their own to decide how to pay for
the remaining 75 percent."49 Ideally, states would reconsider their intrastate
access regimes and reduce the access charges. The amount in reduction of
access charges would be used to fund explicit universal service
mechanisms.50 Realistically, though, states would pass the savings in access
charges to the consumers.5' This practice may leave small telephone
companies serving rural telephone customers with increased local service
rates, because the small telephone companies would have to search for new
ways to cover the costs.
52
The picture is not quite as grim as it appears. FCC Chairman William
E. Kennard indicated in his February 1998 speech before the National
Association of State Utility Consumer Advocates53 that there should be
some flexibility on the possibility of an additional federal contribution
toward universal service beyond existing levels and beyond the 25% share
outlined in the Universal Service Order.54 Of course, the state would still
have to exhaust its ability to make funds available for universal service
support.
Because the 1996 Act permits states to regulate and provide funding
for universal service programs, the question remains whether
telecommunications carriers serving reservations should be subject to state
regulation and taxation. To understand which sovereign may assert
jurisdiction, a detailed history of tribal sovereignty and jurisdictional
commercially will be the amount that the carrier is eligible for from universal service
support.
46. Kathleen Wallman, The Telecommunications Act of 1996: Congress' New Vision for
Universal Servicefor RuralAmerica, 544 PLI/PAT 483,505-06 (1998).
47. In the Matter of Fed.-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., Access Charge Reform,
Seventh Report and Order and Thirteenth Order on Reconsideration in CC Docket 96-45
Fourth Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-262 and Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 8078, para. 19, 16 Comm. Reg. (P & F) 92 (1999).
48. Wallman, supra note 46, at 505-06.
49. Id at 506.
50. Id.
51. See id
52. Id.
53. Id. at 506-07.
54. See Universal Serv., Order, supra note 23.
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analysis is pertinent to the issue of improving telephone penetration rates
on tribal lands.
IIH. DEFINING TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND JURISDICTION
When Chief Justice Marshall wrote the opinion in Worcester v.
Georgia,55 he defined tribal sovereignty with a straightforward approach.
The Court held that the Cherokee Nation was a separate political entity,
within which state authority could not apply, absent the express consent of
Congress.56 In essence, no one could usurp tribal sovereignty without
express authorization by Congress. Due in part to a legacy of broken
treaties, ill-conceived congressional acts, and judicial decisions limiting the
exercise of tribal sovereignty, however, numerous exceptions have arisen
since Worcester, as explained below.
"Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of
sovereignty over both their members and their territory."" Congress never
delegated sovereignty to Tribes; their sovereignty is inherent. Inherent
sovereignty exists by virtue of the federal government's historical
recognition of Indian tribes as independent political entities." Each Tribe's
existence predates this nation's existence. 9 Tribes no longer maintain
absolute sovereignty over their members, however. Tribal sovereignty is
now described as having "a unique and limited character."60 "As a general
rule, Indian tribes today still possess those aspects of their inherent tribal
sovereignty which are not expressly withdrawn by treaty or statute, or by
'implication' as a necessary result of their so-called dependent status."'Q
Examples of express limitations upon tribal sovereignty are those
imposed by treaties62 and by congressional acts.63 Despite these two
possible means to limit tribal sovereignty, however, Congress has refused
to expressly limit the exercise of tribal sovereignty. Surprisingly, in the last
55. 31 U.S. (6 Pet) 515 (1832).
56. Id. at 556-57.
57. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 545,557 (1975), quoted in Iowa Mutual Ins. Co.
v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987); New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324,
332 (1983); White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980).
58. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,55-56 (1978).
59. See id at 56.
60. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).
61. John Fredericks III, America's First Nations: The Origins, History and Future of
American Indian Sovereignty, 7 J.L. & POL'Y 347, 386 (1998).
62. Tribes ceded vast portions of their territory in exchange for certain concessions (like
food rations) and reservations of small territory. See CoHEN, supra note 14.
63. Congress enacted Public Law 280, which gave six states criminal and civiljurisdiction over acts arising within designated Indian reservations. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162(1994); 25 U.S.C. § 1321-1326 (1994); 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1994).
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two decades, it is the Supreme Court that has failed to follow Congress's
lead in this respect.64 Instead, implied limitations are now judicially created
and imposed by the Supreme Court. In fact, the Court creates these
limitations by interpreting treaties and congressional statutes as
"implicitly" diminishing tribal sovereignty.65 These implicit limitations
arise, quite frequently, when cases involve a Tribe's relations with non-
Indians.
The Court has found that Tribes cannot freely alienate their lands to
non-Indians, cannot enter directly into commercial or governmental
relations with foreign nations, and cannot exercise criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indians in tribal court.66 Beginning in 1978, the Supreme Court
began-and continues to this day-to expand the implicit limitations on
tribal sovereignty.
67
Among those implicit limitations on tribal sovereignty is civil
jurisdiction over tribal lands alienated to non-Indians within reservation
boundaries. This judicially created limitation on Tribes' territorial
sovereignty presents the biggest threat to Tribes. In Montana v. United
States,6" the Court held that Indians, as a consequence of alienating tribal
land to non-Indians, do not have authority to regulate non-Indians on non-
Indian fee land, even though conduct occurs within the boundaries of the
Tribe's reservation. 69 "While recognizing that the Tribe's authority to
regulate the conduct of non-Indians on Indian owned land remained very
broad and exclusive, the Court declined to recognize the Tribe's general
sovereignty over land within [its] reservation .... ,7os a result, the Court
equated tribal sovereignty with land ownership, thus creating a confusing
checkerboard pattern of state/tribal jurisdiction on allotted reservations.
The Court announced two exceptions to the rule in Montana that
recognized that even on non-Indian fee land, Tribes still retain jurisdiction
when a nontribal member enters into "consensual relationships with the
tribe or its members" or when the nonmember's conduct on reservation fee
land directly affects the Tribe's "political integrity, the economic security,
or the health or welfare of the tribe."7' Although the exceptions seem
significant, the Supreme Court has enunciated no clear test to determine
64. See Fredericks, supra note 61, at 388.
65. Id.
66. See Brendale v. Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408,426 (1989).
67. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
68. 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
69. See id at 565-66.
70. Fredericks, supra note 61, at 393.
71. Montana, 450 U.S. at 565-66.
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whether a nonmember's conduct on fee lands comes within one of these
exceptions.
72
In Brendale v. Confederated Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian
Nation,73 the Court indicated that the impact on the Tribe's political
integrity, economic security, or health or welfare must be "demonstrably
serious" and must "imperil" these interests.74 The Brendale decision
confused tribal jurisdiction analysis even further by distinguishing between
"open areas" of the reservation and "closed areas." The Confederated
Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian reservations maintained an open
area which had been "opened" to non-Indian settlement after allotment. As
a result, nonmembers owned almost half of the land in the area in fee.75 The
"closed area" of the reservation consisted primarily of Indian trust land
76with a few non-Indian landowners. The Court concluded that the Tribe
implicitly divested its authority over non-Indian fee land in the open area,
but not in the closed area where non-Indians on fee land also resided.77
Recently, "in Strate v. A-1 Contractors, the Supreme Court... held
that tribal courts cannot exercise civil jurisdiction over an action between
non-Indians for actions arising on state highways crossing Indian trust land
within reservations."'78 In so holding, the Court treated the state highway as
an equivalent to fee land. An interesting and important string cite hidden
within the majority opinion may suggest some "wiggle room" for Tribes to
retain their sovereignty. The Court states that the following activities fit
within Montana's first exception for consensual relationships:
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (declaring tribal jurisdiction
exclusive over lawsuit arising out of on-reservation sales transaction
between nonmember plaintiff and member defendants); Morris v.
Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904) (upholding tribal permit tax on
nonmember-owned livestock within boundaries of the Chickasaw
Nation); Buster v. Wright, 135 F. 947, 950 (CA8 1905) (upholding
Tribe's permit tax on nonmembers for the privilege of conducting
business within Tribe's borders; court characterized as "inherene' the
Tribe's "authority ... to prescribe the terms upon which noncitizens
may transact business within its borders"); Colville, 447 U.S., at 152-
154 (tribal authority to tax on-reservation cigarette sales to
nonmembers "is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the
Tribes retain unless divested of it by federal law or necessary
72. Fredericks, supra note 61, at 393.
73. 492 U.S. 408 (1989).
74. Id. at431.
75. Id. at 415-16.
76. Id. at 415.
77. See id at 421-33.
78. Fredericks, supra note 61, at 395 (citing Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,
442,459 (1997)).
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implication of their dependent status"). 79
The Court may seem willing to permit Tribes to maintain their
inherent sovereignty anywhere within reservation boundaries if non-Indians
enter into consensual agreements with the Tribe. Since Strate, however, the
Court has not entertained jurisdictional questions that advance this line of
thought.
As a result of the Supreme Court's liberal use of so-called "implicit
limitations" upon tribal sovereignty, the Court has essentially taken on the
role of Congress and assumed the authority to decide when to modify or
abrogate a Tribe's inherent or treaty-protected sovereignty. The Court has
effectively reversed the presumption that reserved Indian Tribes' sovereign
authority over lands that constitute their reservations, unless Congress
explicitly limits the exercise of that sovereignty by treaty or statute. In
contrast, the Court in the Montana line of cases presumes that Tribes lack
jurisdiction to regulate the lands or conduct of non-Indians on non-Indian
fee land within reservation borders unless Congress has expressly conferred
such authority by statute or treaty, or unless one of the two Montana
exceptions applies.
In recent times, the Court has steered away from tribal sovereignty
arguments and has relied upon federal preemption to burden a.Tribe's
ability to regulate on-reservation transactions with Indians and non-
Indians.80 Specifically, the Court in Cotton Petroleum Corporation v. New
Mexico emphasized the reasoning in McClanahan that the right of tribal
sovereignty serves more as a "backdrop against which the applicable
treaties and federal statutes must be read," instead of a means of
preemption.81
IV. DEFINING STATE JURISDICTION:
COTFON PETROLEUM CORP. V. NEWMEXICO
When it issued the Cotton decision, the Supreme Court continued to
chip away at traditional notions of tribal sovereignty, thus making it more
difficult for Indians to develop tribal economic resources.3 2 The Court
affirmed New Mexico's right to impose a severance tax on gas and oil
produced by Cotton Petroleum Corporation, a non-Indian lessee, on the
Jicarilla Apache Reservation, despite the fact that the corporation was
79. Strate, 520 U.S. 438,457 (1997).
80. See McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
81. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 176 (1989) (citing
McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172).
82. Id. at206,208-09 (Blackmun J., dissenting).
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subject to tribal severance taxes." The Tribe filed an amicus brief, arguing
that both tribal and state taxation of on-reservation production would
reduce the desirability of the Tribe's leases and hinder the Tribe's
economic development, because the leases represented the major source of
tribal revenues. Moreover, by allowing dual taxation, the Supreme Court
set aside traditional notions of federal policy by limiting the Tribe's ability
to profit from on-reservation activities. The Court found, however, that
Congress never expressly or impliedly intended to preempt state taxation."
The Court relied on the fact that federal regulation of oil and gas
production was not exclusive and that the state's taxes did not
"substantially burden! the Tribe.
86
In holding that federal law does not preempt state taxes, the Supreme
Court changed the analysis of Indian preemption to the detriment of the
Tribes. Indian tribes are distinct sovereign entities, which means state law
should not penetrate reservation boundaries.'s Tribal sovereignty was
initially used to bar state jurisdiction;8 9 since Cotton, however, tribal
sovereignty is used primarily as a backdrop to preemption analysis.
Therefore, in determining whether a federal law preempts state law, the
Court considers: (1) tribal sovereignty as a "backdrop" to federal statutes or
treaties; (2) the comprehensiveness of federal statutes granting tribal taxing
authority; and (3) the balance of federal and tribal interest against the
states' interests. 0 Accordingly, if extensive federal regulation exists, this
leaves no room for the exercise of state authority. Likewise, if state
authority infringes on the Tribe's right to "make [its] own laws and be
ruled by them," 91 then states lack authority to regulate Tribes. The three-
part analysis requires a balancing of tribal, federal, and state interests. For
example, a state's regulatory interest will be greater and more compelling if
the state can show off-reservation effects, like service to non-Indians from
83. Id. at 163.
84. Ia at 176n.11,208-09.
85. Id. at 183 n.14.
86. Id. at 186.
87. Indian preemption analysis starts with the principle that federal preemption exists
unless the Court finds congressional intent to allow state intervention. The analysis begins
with federal preemption because Congress has almost exclusive federal control of Indian
policy. McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 164-65 (1973); Williams
v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 221 (1959). This analysis is contrary to general preemption, which
assumes state intervention unless congressional intent to preempt is established.
88. See Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
89. See McClanahan, 411 U.S. at 172.
90. See Cotton Petroleum Corp., 490 U.S. at 176.
91. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (quoting Williams,
358 U.S. at 220).
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an on-reservation corporation.92 The state's interests are less if the state
seeks to tax on-reservation transactions between Tribes and non-Indians
just to raise state revenues. 9'
In Cotton, the majority found that significant state interests offset
federal and tribal interests, because New Mexico provided approximately
three million dollars per year to both Cotton and the Tribe and regulated
spacing and mechanical integrity of the gas and oil wells.94 Furthermore,
the Court indicated that the Tribe could increase its taxes without adversely
affecting on-reservation oil and gas development because the state tax did
not fall on the Tribe, but on Cotton Petroleum Corporation.95
Therefore, the Court appeared to hold that if a state provides some
services to the Tribes on a reservation, then justification for permitting state
taxation on reservations exists. In particular, if the economic burden (a
state tax) does not fall directly on the Tribes, and identifiable state interests
exist (any interest concerning possible gain or loss of revenue), there
cannot be comprehensive federal regulation to preempt state law. In sum,
the Cotton dissent correctly criticizes the majority's use of the "inexorable
zero" 97 element to deny preemption "unless the States are entirely excluded
from a sphere of activity and provide no services to the Indians or to the
lessees they seek to tax."98
Cotton may set "a precedent for the requirement of more
comprehensive congressional 'occupation of the field' [of Indian law]
before preemption is honored." 99 Because the Supreme Court appears
indifferent to the Tribe's inability to conduct transactions on and off the
reservations without suffering economic hardship because of dual taxation
and regulation, the FCC must understand how tribal and state jurisdictional
analysis principles apply to tribally owned and non-Indian-owned telcos
92. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324,336 (1983).
93. See Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc., v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S.
832, 845 (1982); see also White Mountain Apache Tribe, 448 U.S. at 150; Warren Trading
Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n, 380 U.S. 685, 691 (1965).
94. See Cotton, 490 U.S. at 207 n.1l (Blackmun 3., dissenting). The dissent found that
the oil- and gas-related revenues expended by the state for the Tribe over the five-year
period contested were $89,384, compared to $1,206,800 in federal funds and $736,358 in
tribal funds. Id at 207 n.11. (Blackmun, I dissenting) (citing Brief for Jicarilla Apache
Tribe as Amicus Curiae 10-11 n.8).
95. Id. at 185.
96. Id. at 190.
97. Id. at 204 (Blackmun I., dissenting) (quoting Int'l Bd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324,342 n.23 (1977)).
98. Id.
99. Daniel Gluck, Note, A Tale of Two Taxes-Preemption on the Reservation: Cotton
Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 43 TAx Lmw. 359,372 (1990).
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serving reservations.
V. APPLYING INDIAN JURISDICTIONAL ANALYSIS TO TELCOS
SERVING TRIBAL LANDS: A STUDY OF SOUTH DAKOTA
To promote tribal sovereignty, self-sufficiency, and economic
development, the FCC must comprehend the complexities of applying state
and tribal jurisdictions. Determining which sovereign has jurisdiction is not
always easy. For example, Tribes and states may have exclusive or
concurrent taxation and regulatory authority. The following applications of
tribal and state jurisdiction will assist the FCC in conceptualizing
jurisdictional analysis.
A. Relationship Between South Dakota Public Utilities Commission
and Telcos Serving Tribal Lands
The Cheyenne River Sioux Reservation in north central South Dakota
encompasses 4,600 square miles, with approximately 11,000 Indians and
non-Indians living on the reservation.00 Since 1958, the Cheyenne River
Sioux Tribe ("CRST") has owned and operated its Telephone Authority
("CRSTTA") in Eagle Butte, South Dakota.'0 ' Although the current
penetration rate is 75%, '°2 basic telephone service is available to 100% of
tribal lands served by CRST.J° Moreover, the CRSTTA extends 2,900
access lines into reservation households.' 4
Although located off the reservation and not tribally owned, Golden
West serves the Oglala Sioux Tribe on the Pine Ridge Indian Reservation
in southwest South Dakota.'05 While telephone service is available to 100%
of the reservations, only 86% of Pine Ridge customers subscribe to
telephone service.
0 6
Both Tribes can provide affordable, basic telephone service through
support from federal universal service funds. Section 254(t) of the 1996
100. See NATIONAL TELEPHONE COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION, DIAL-TONE IS NOT ENOUGH:
SERVING TRIBAL LANDS 18 (1999) available at http.//www.ncta.org/leg-reg/
white?4TRIBAL4.pdf [hereinafter DIAL-TONE].
101. Id. at 17-18.
102. See FCC Public Hearing, 33 (Mar. 23, 1999) (testimony of J.D. Williams, CRST
general manager) at http//%vww.fcc.gov/PaneLDiscussionsfTeleservicereservations/
march23/32399fcc.txt [hereinafter FCC Public Hearing].
103. DIAL-TONE, supra note 100, at 18. The Telephone Authority serves 80% of the
Cheyenne River Sioux Reservations. Id at 18 n.44.
104. See FCC Public Hearing, supra note 102, at 38.
105. DiAL-ToNE, supra note 100, at 18. Golden West is based in Wall, South Dakota. I,
at 18 n.46.
106. Id. at 18.
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Act permits states to adopt regulations consistent with the FCC's rules to
advance universal service.'01 To this end, South Dakota implemented
statutes applicable to rural service carriers and service areas. South Dakota
Codified Law section 49-31-73 states, in part:
[f the applicant proposes to provide any local exchange service in the
service area of a rural telephone company, the applicant is required to
satisfy the service obligations of an eligible telecommunications carrier
as set forth in 47 U.S.C. § 214 (e)(1) ... within ajeographic area as
determined by the [South Dakota] commision [sic].'
Furthermore, the South Dakota Public Utilities Commission may
"designate a common carrier as an eligible telecommunications carrier for a
service area."'' 9 The South Dakota Commission may also designate service
areas consistent with 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)." °
Although certain FCC proposals appear to promote tribal sovereignty,
in reality those proposals have no bite when it comes to providing Tribes
the ability to designate and regulate their own telcos. In fact, Tribes still
litigate the issue of whether they have regulatory jurisdiction over carriers
serving tribal lands because current federal regulations provide state public
utilities commissions with increasing authority to regulate their eligible
carriers. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Telephone Authority v. Public
Utilities Commission of South Dakota." provides a good example of why
FCC proposals provide Tribes with little assurance of maintaining tribal
sovereignty over their economic development.
B. Regulation of Telcos Serving Tribal Lands
In Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Telephone Authority v. Public Utilities
Commission of South Dakota," CRSTTA appealed South Dakota's Public
Utilities Commission's decision denying a proposed sale of three telephone
exchanges from US West, on which CRSTTA had successfully bid several
years prior to this case." 3 The dispute involved whether South Dakota's
Public Utilities Commission could assert jurisdiction over the sale of the
107. 47 U.s.C. § 254(0 (Supp. IV 1998).
108. S.D. CODIMD LAvs § 49-31-73 (Michie 2000). South Dakota, however, does not
have jurisdiction to designate common carriers owned by Tribes as eligible for state
universal service funds. Recently, Congress amended the 1996 Act to state, "In the case of a
common carrier providing telephone exchange service and exchange access that is not
subject to the jurisdiction of a State commission, the Commission shall upon request
designate such a common carrier." 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(6).
109. S.D. CODIED LAWS § 49-31-78.
110. Id.
111. 595 N.W.2d 604 (1999).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 605.
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on-reservation portion of exchange."4 CRSTTA asserted that the Public
Utilities Commission lacked authority to regulate its business activities
within the boundaries of the reservation because the Tribe had approved the
transaction." 5 By asserting jurisdiction, the Public Utilities Commission
infringed the Tribe's exercise of tribal sovereignty by not allowing the
Tribe to determine with whom it does business.'6 Under Montana, the
CRSTTA argued that a Tribe may regulate activities of nonmembers on
tribal lands who enter consensual contracts with the Tribe or its
members."17 Furthermore, CRSTTA argued that the Public Utilities
Commission was preempted by the federal interest of "'promoting
economic development and self-sufficiency for Indian tribes."'
Despite the fact that congressional initiatives encourage and promote
economic growth for Tribes, the Court rejected the argument by stating that
the current FCC regulations allowed state Public Utilities Commissions to
regulate "all consumers, whether they reside on or off an Indian
reservation."" 9 Therefore, South Dakota's Public Utilities Commission's
authority was not preempted by federal law, but rather, "is a significant, as
well as authorized, part of the overall regulatory scheme"'2 to protect
telecommunications consumers.
Current FCC proposals offer the same encouragement and promotion
of economic growth on reservations. As indicated by the South Dakota
case, however, the FCC proposals are easily defeated because they do not
provide preemptive legislation needed to deny states' regulation over
carriers serving tribal lands.
C. Taxation of Telcos Serving Tribal Lands
In addition to designating and regulating eligible carriers and service
areas, South Dakota's Public Utilities Commission may examine and
inspect telcos and their records, require annual reports, inquire into the
telcos' management, require monetary deposits into the South Dakota
Public Utilities Commission Regulatory Assessment Fee Fund, and tax
telcos.1 Because states traditionally have regulated and taxed telcos undertheir jurisdictions, tribally owned and non-Indian-owned telcos may also be
114. Id. at608.
115. Il at609.
116. Id.
117. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,565 (1981).
118. Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe Tel. Auth., 595 N.W.2d at 610 (quoting White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 143 (1980)).
119. Id.at6ll.
120. Id.
121. S.D. CODMMDLAws §§ 49-31-7.1, 12.6 (Michie2000).
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subject to states' authority.
South Dakota has no interest in taxing on-reservation transactions
between a tribally owned telco and tribal members because Tribes have
sole jurisdiction in regulating the "political integrity, the economic
security,[and] the health [and] welfare" for their members!1 After opening
up reservations for westward expansion, however, virtually no reservations
are exclusively Indian. Therefore, tribally owned telcos provide basic
telephone service to non-Indians, as well as their tribal members.
South Dakota's interests are reduced if it seeks to tax on-reservation
transactions between Tribes and non-Indians on trust land and on nonfee
land within the reservation just to raise state revenue.'2' Nonetheless,
Cotton suggests that a state should not be excluded from taxing on-
reservation businesses providing any services to the Tribe. 4 For example,
South Dakota prescribes forms for eligible telecommuniations carriers to
keep records of their expenses and provides state officials to inspect and
examine telcos.'25 Regardless of whether the state provides minimal funds
to regulate eligible carriers in proportion to tribal expenditures on similar
services, the state's taxation is justified.
Tribally owned telcos may concede that states have concurrent
jurisdiction in taxation and regulation when the burden falls directly on the
non-Indian company. The state's taxes would fall directly on the Tribe,
however, via the tribally owned telco, and, therefore, would prevent states
from asserting jurisdiction. Although this argument is appealing, the Cotton
decision implies that if the state identifies any interest in regulation and
taxation of on-reservation activities, then the state should not be barred
from asserting jurisdiction.26
Finally, jurisdiction is simple when activities occur off of the
reservation. State law applies to telephone services provided by off-
reservation companies, such as Golden West's telephone service to Pine
Ridge Reservation, unless there is "express federal law to the contrary.',
27
Jurisdictional analysis is important to discern which sovereign, the
state or Tribe, acquires regulatory authority over telcos serving
reservations. Emphasis should be placed, however, on finding solutions
122. Montana, 450 U.S. at 566.
123. See Ramah Navajo Sch. Bd., Inc. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S.
832, 845 (1982).
124. Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 203 (1989) (Blackmun J.,
dissenting).
125. S.D. CODImDLAws § 49-31-7.1.
126. See Cotton, 490 U.S. at 189-90.
127. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
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that would prevent Tribes and states from litigating which sovereign has
taxation and regulatory authority over eligible carriers.
VI. SOLVING JURISDICTIONAL ISSUES TO PROMOTE UNIVERSAL
SERVICE PROGRAMS AND INCREASE TRIBAL TELEPHONE
PENETRATION RATES
Tribal jurisdiction precedent and Cotton Petroleum emphasize the
need for explicit congressional statements authorizing tribal jurisdiction
over eligible telecommunications carriers serving their reservations,
without concurrent state regulation. Controversies over jurisdictional issues
impede the economic growth of reservations because reservations do not
present commercially attractive service areas. Sparse population and low
penetration rates deter larger companies from serving tribal lands because
service is expensive and the return is lower on a per-subscriber level.
Because the reservation is expensive to service, common carriers need
universal support mechanisms to help defray the high costs of providing
service. Therefore, the FCC must develop and present a plan to Congress
that will facilitate the 1996 Act's goal of ensuring that all Americans have
access to affordable telecommunications services. 
28
A. Express Congressional Preemption of State Public Utilities
Regulation
In deciding whether state jurisdiction applies, courts currently
examine whether Congress enacted comprehensive federal statutes granting
tribal taxing and regulatory authority. 29 Tribal sovereignty serves as a
"backdrop" to the applicable federal statutes.' 30 Therefore, Tribes must be
given the authority to regulate tribally owned and non-Indian-owned telcos,
located both on and off the reservation, without state interference. This
forbearance would increase telephone penetration rates and promote
economic growth. Tribal jurisdiction precedent and sovereignty support
this view.
First, under Montana, Tribes may regulate non-Indians on non-Indian
fee land within the reservation if the nontribal member enters into
"consensual relationships with the tribe or its members" or "when that
conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the
economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe."' 3' Non-Indians
contract for basic telephone services provided by tribally owned telcos.
128. See 47 U.S.C. § 257(b) (Supp. IV 1998).
129. See Cotton, 490 U.S. at 175.
130. See McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n of Arizona, 411 U.S. 164, 172 (1973).
131. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,565-66 (1981).
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This transaction falls within the first Montana exception because both
parties have entered a voluntary, contractual relationship.
Second, non-Indian-owned telcos advancing telephone services to
non-Indians and Indians arguably fall under Montana's second exception.
The Supreme Court, in Brendale, announced that the impact on the Tribe's
political integrity, economic security, or health or welfare must be
"demonstrably serious" and must "imperil" these interests.
32
Unemployment rates on Indian reservations are 43%, with the highest rate
being 75%.133 Advanced telecommunication infrastructures encourage
growth. Specifically, Tribes are able to attract businesses to the area
because technology is not an impediment to facilitating business
transactions. Accordingly, tribal regulation of non-Indian telcos is
important in maintaining economic security and growth on the reservation.
Lastly, states may regulate Indian and non-Indian telcos if their
services are provided to Indians by off-reservation companies. State law
applies, however, unless there is "express federal law to the contrary."'
134
Again, the FCC must emphasize and propose to Congress a provision
granting exclusive regulatory and taxing jurisdiction to Tribes; otherwise,
any service, whether it be designating service areas or prescribing forms,
will permit states to tax and regulate reservation telecommunication
carriers.'
3
B. Amend 1996 Act Provisions
Although Congress amended the 1996 Act to permit the FCC to
designate eligible telecommunications carriers not subject to state
jurisdiction, 16 this amendment is not enough to prevent states from
asserting jurisdiction. Indeed, once the FCC designates eligible carriers,
states still provide a percentage of universal service funds to the carriers,' 37
especially for nonrural carriers. While the federal share of the difference
between the carrier's costs for support services and the national benchmark
is 25%,' the states provide the remaining 75% for nonrural carriers. 39
132. Brendale v. Confederate Tribes and Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S.
408,431 (1989).
133. NATIONAL TELEPHONE COOPERATIVE ASSOCIATION, NTCA MEMBERS SERVNG
TRIBAL AREAS: SURVEY REPORT 4 (1999), available at httpJlwww.ntca.org/leg-
reg/whiteITR11299.pdf. (Pine Ridge Reservation had the highest unemployment rate.)
134. Mescalero Apache v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973).
135. See Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico, 490 U.S. 163, 173 (1989).
136. 47 U.S.C. § 214(e)(6) (Supp. IV 1998).
137. Id. § 214(e)(2)-(4).
138. Universal Serv., Order, supra note 23, para. 269.
139. Id.
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When dealing with tribally owned or non-Indian-owned telcos serving
reservations, the FCC should contribute 100%. Congress's fiduciary duty
mandates this proposal. Indeed, the United States, in dealing with Indians,
"'has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest responsibility and
trust. Its conduct, ... should therefore be judged by the most exacting
fiduciary standards.
'
"
140
Finally, the FCC must do more than place in writing a provision
affirming that Tribes and federal agencies must communicate on a
government-to-government basis, and not government-to-"dependent
wards" negotiations. 141 While this government-to-government relationship
places Tribes back on the road to tribal sovereignty-a road that was long
deserted because of the judiciary's role in divesting the Tribe's ability to
retain authority over its "political integrity[-]the economic security,[and]
health [and] welfare" of its people,42 only congressional legislation can
preempt state regulation and taxation. Stated differently, "[d]iminishment
by judicial, not legislative, fiat preempts legislative prerogative and makes
it much harder for tribal advocates to guard the remaining vestiges of tribal
sovereignty.,
43
C. Encourage Cooperation and Provide Incentives for Tribes to Own
Their Carriers
In 1987, Tohono O'odham Nation purchased facilities from US West
140. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 354 F. Supp. 252, 256 (D.D.C.
1972) (quoting Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942), rev'dc 499 F.2d
1095 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
141. On April 29, 1994, President Bill Clinton mandated that all federal agencies and
departments establish meaningful government-to-government relationships with Indian
Tribes. Exec. Mem. of April 29, 1994, 3 C.F.R. 1007 (1994). See also Exec. Order No.
13,084, 3 C.F.R. 150 (1999) (The President's recent order declares the Clinton
Administration's commitment to tribal sovereignty, a commitment based upon a historic
government-to-government relationship:
The United States has a unique legal relationship with Indian tribal governments
as set forth in the Constitution of the United States, treaties, statutes, Executive
orders, and court decisions. Since the formation of the Union, the United States
has recognized Indian tribes as domestic dependent nations under its protection. In
treaties, our Nation has guaranteed the right of Indian tribes to self-government.
As domestic dependent nations, Indian tribes exercise inherent sovereign power
over their members and territory. The United States continues to work with Indian
tribes on a government-to-government basis to address issues concerning Indian
tribal self-government, trust resources, and Indian tribal treaty and other rights.).
Id
142. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,566 (1981).
143. Robert Laurence, The Unseemly Nature of Reservation Diminishment by Judicial,
as Opposed to Legislative, Fiat and the Ironic Role of the Indian Civil Rights Act in
Limiting Both, 71 N.D. L. REV. 393,394 (1985).
[Vol. 53
Number 1] TELEPHONE SERVICE ON TRIBAL LANDS
to serve 390 subscribers. ' " Today, the tribally owned carrier serves nearly
eight times the number of subscribers served by US West (now Qwest). 45
Telephone penetration rates began at a low 20% and climbed to 70% once
the Tribe improved the service.146 Tohono O'odham Nation improved
telephone services by borrowing from the Rural Utilities Service
(RUS").1 47 RUS makes loans available to rural telecommunications
carriers without charging construction costs. The FCC must encourage
Congress to implement more programs similar to RUS in order to provide
incentives for Tribes to construct their own telcos. Likewise, existing non-
Indian telcos must communicate and cooperate with Tribes.
For example, on the Crow Reservation in southeastern Montana,
Project Telephone Company employs predominantly Crow tribal members,
many of whom are fluent in the Crow language.'48 Project also appointed a
member of the Crow Tribe to be a full-voting member of the telco's board
of directors.149 Project staff members are required to attend cultural
awareness sessions covering the history of the Crow Tribe, tribal
governmental structure, and language."O This example provides evidence
of a working relationship between a non-Indian-owned telco and a Tribe.
Before Project Telephone Company began providing services to the
reservation, it received approval from the Crow Tribe to operate. Although
the Crow Tribe did not fund the telco, the Tribe remains an active
participant in its operations.
D. Negotiate Contractual Agreements Between Tribes and States
Tribes should have the opportunity to negotiate cooperative
agreements to waive state or tribal jurisdiction. Cooperative agreements are
not new to Federal Indian law. For instance, businesses that otherwise
might locate upon or contract to do work within reservations may be
deterred by the lack of remedies for contractual breaches or torts because
Tribes enjoy sovereign immunity, in much the same manner as the United
States.'*" Despite the fact that tribal sovereign immunity is protected both to
sustain tribal self-determination and to encourage economic
144. DIAL-ToNE, supra note 100, at 27.
145. Ia
146. Idt at 16-17.
147. Id- at 17. Rural Utilities Service is a rural development agency of the U.S.
Department of Agriculture that assists in financing construction of telecommunications in
rural America.
148. Id. at 27.
149. id.
150. Id.
151. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49,58 (1978).
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development,5 Tribes contractually agree to limit waivers of sovereign
immunity. Similarly, Tribes and states should negotiate which sovereign
will assert jurisdiction, either concurrently or exclusively. Contractual
agreements will provide assurances to outside telecommunications carriers
that their businesses will not be dually taxed or regulated. Thus,
cooperative and contractual agreements encourage potential telcos to
construct telecommunications infrastructure because the contractual
agreements limit the telco's costs, in an otherwise high-cost support area.
VII. CONCLUSION
As this Note demonstrates, the Supreme Court is currently engaging
in a campaign to divest Tribes of their sovereignty over transactions
developing on and off tribal lands. Because tribal sovereignty is judicially
limited, Congress must act according to its fiduciary duties and explicitly
preempt states from asserting jurisdiction over telecommunications carriers
and universal fund programs serving tribal lands. Tribes can neither be
sovereign nor self-sufficient if their authority is limited to activities that
involve their own members or tribally owned telecommunications carriers.
Importantly, by issuing an express statement against state jurisdiction,
Congress would assist Tribes in increasing telephone penetration rates
(along with economic development) because eligible carriers would be
assured that their companies would not be dually taxed and regulated by
both sovereigns.
Finally, Tribes should be given incentives to invest in their own
telcos. The FCC would further this goal by providing 100% support in
universal service funding, instead of 25%. By contributing 100% support to
eligible carriers serving tribal lands, the states no longer have taxation and
regulatory authority since they are not providing any services to tribal
lands. The 100% support would comply with Congress's fiduciary duty and
moral obligation to Tribes. With these proposed changes, tribal and state
jurisdictional problems would be less of an issue; therefore, the FCC would
accomplish its goal of providing low-cost, affordable basic telephone rates
on tribal lands.
152. See Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S.
505,510 (1991) (quoting California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 216
(1987)).
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